, or noûs, as a second hypostasis in between Soul and the One and identical with Being. L. argues furthermore that this concept shaped the way in which Plotinus did philosophy. More particularly, L. sees the Enneads as a 'discursive practice of noûs' which aims at reaching the principle that inspires the text, noûs itself. By this, he means that when the human soul philosophizes, it imitates the activity of noûs in its own fashion. Noûs coincides with its object of contemplation, the intelligible Forms. Therefore noûs is able to contemplate them all at once. The human soul is incapable of this sort of simultaneous contemplation: it contemplates reality discursively, i.e. in bits and pieces, which it subsequently has to recollect and recompose into a uniµed whole. In the same way, L. argues, we have to read the Enneads: we should not view the treatises as self-contained units, but instead we are allowed to, and in fact should, break them up into pieces and then recompose something new out of it. The various chapters of the book focus on noûs from di ¶erent perspectives and thus provide a leçon par l'example of this practice, which includes, for example, a discussion of the practice of exegesis and of polemic in Plotinus.
L.'s unexpected solution for one of the vexed problems of Plotinian studies, the existence of ideas of individuals (Chapter 6), may serve as an example of L.'s practice of noûs at work. The issue has provoked a lot of discussion, since he seems to hold di ¶erent views on the matter at di ¶erent times. L. rejects the two most obvious solutions, that either Plotinus changed his mind over time or that the inconsistency is only seemingly. He argues instead that Plotinus explicitly wanted to be inconsistent in order to make us discover something about ourselves. Plotinus may show himself to be well aware of the limitations of logical thought, yet the idea that he is sowing hidden contradictions throughout the Enneads on purpose I µnd highly unlikely.
In conclusion, this book is an interesting, yet failed, experiment in reading Plotinus. The focus of this monograph is, as its title suggests, the ethical stance of the spoudaios in Plotinus' Enneads. Schniewind provides in her introduction an accurate summary of the work of previous writers on Plotinus' ethical theory. This summary demonstrates that there is some disagreement as to whether or not Plotinus provides an ethic that is applicable to the ordinary man, as opposed to the spoudaios. A number of writers, this reviewer included, have found it di¸cult to see what practical ethical guidance is available to the ordinary man in the egoistic behaviour of the Plotinian spoudaios. Yet Porphyry's Life presents Plotinus, whom one must assume was a spoudaios, as a µgure deeply involved with the life of the community and not the austere µgure that the Enneads seem to conjure up. S. claims that this dichotomy can be resolved upon examination of the µgure of the spoudaios, and in the seven chapters that make up this monograph, she argues her case in a thorough and scholarly manner. Chapter 1 examines the historical context for the term spoudaios, examining its development prior to its use by Plotinus. S. notes the importance of Aristotle in imbuing the term with moral connotations. The Stoics used the term interchangeably with sophos, and Plotinus, borrowing from both, employs the term to describe a man who has reduced the aspects of his corporeal self to a minimum, and become self-conscious at the level of his higher soul in the timelessness of Intellect. Like the Stoic sophos, the Plotinian spoudaios displays little emotion concerning the events of the sense world, which is a mere re·ection of true life in Intellect. Since wise, good, fulµlled, etc. simply do not do justice to what Plotinus means by the spoudaios, S. sensibly transliterates throughout.
Leiden University
In essence, Chapters 2-6 examine Ennead 1.4 [46] , 'On Well-Being' (Peri Eudaimonias), since it contains the most sustained analysis of the spoudaios to be
